

*Cry Necessity! / Oh Happy Necessity*  
**why the necessarily free, freely necessary God is necessary**

How free is God? Did he have to make precisely this world? Could he have done other than he has done at any point?

Jonathan Edwards rightly argues that all of God's actions are freely necessary and freely necessary. All that God does flows infallibly from who he is and is governed by his perfect wisdom so that God always does what he wants, which is the best, and delights so to do. God could never do anything differently.

Unfortunately, Edwards is a lone voice even amongst the giants of Reformed theology in asserting the necessity of all God's actions, but his view deserves to be the Reformed consensus.

The general Reformed rejection of this understanding is understandable and the doctrine must be stated carefully to answer legitimate concerns but the alternatives are much less satisfactory. Properly understood, the free necessity of all God's actions is most harmonious with a Reformed understanding and indeed is implied by the Reformed case for liberty of spontaneity rather than liberty of indifference in human salvation, as we shall see.

**(1) How free is God?**

**(a) God is free from all external constraint: He is not limited by anything else**

We may build up the case for the freedom of God by arguing, first, that God is free from all constraint from outside Himself.

Thus, as Richard Muller writes, for the Reformed Scholastics God has "*libertas a coactione*: freedom from coercion or coercion." He explains that "in scholastic thought, [this is] the basic criterion for freedom of action or choice.". All God's acts may be considered free acts or choices as they are "self-determined or inwardly determined... [and] in no way the result of external compulsion or externally imposed constraint."<sup>1</sup>

The omnipotent God is free from all rivals. No one can stay God's hand (Daniel 4:35), oppose (Job 23:13) or thwart him (Isaiah 14:27).

The omnipresent God is free from all spatial limitations. Heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain him (1 Kings 8:27). God fills all things (Jeremiah 22:23f; c.f. Ephesians 4:8).

The eternal God is free from all temporal limitations (Genesis 21:33; Deuteronomy 33:27; Romans 1:20). "With the Lord a day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day" (2 Peter 3:8; c.f. Psalm 90:4). God is the Lord of time (Acts 1:7).

---

<sup>1</sup> Muller, Dictionary, p176.

**(b) God has liberty of spontaneity: He always does what he wants**

Since God is subject to no external constraints, He has liberty of spontaneity: God does whatever he pleases (Psalm 115:3; 135:6). He works all things according to the counsel of his will (Ephesians 1:11).

**(c) God is free to be God: He is self-determined**

Karl Barth deploys the doctrine of election or predestination innovatively by stating that: “Primarily God elected or predestinated Himself”<sup>2</sup>. William Johnson explains that for Barth, God’s first determination is of his own being: “God’s own self-determination (*selbstbestimmung*).” To be “self-determined” is to act freely without coercion. In election, God acts in conformity to God’s character; God is “determined” to be who God really is.”<sup>3</sup> Barth’s may be a striking way of stating the doctrine, but it entailed in classic Reformed theology, indeed, it is part of the classical doctrine of God.

God thus has “*libertas naturae*: the freedom or liberty of nature; viz., the liberty that is proper to a being given its particular nature. No being, not even omnipotent God, can act contrary to its nature.”<sup>4</sup>

**(d) Some things are impossible to God**

Therefore, according to Francis Turretin, there are moral impossibilities for God: “what cannot be done according to the laws of holiness”<sup>5</sup> since God always acts in accord with his perfectly good nature: “God cannot look at wrong” (Habakkuk 1:13); “he cannot deny himself” (2 Timothy 2:13); “cannot be tempted with evil” (James 1:13); he is “God, who never lies” (Titus 1:2; c.f. Numbers 23:19; Hebrews 6:18). God is not free to sin since he always acts in accord with his perfect goodness. He cannot cease to be God since he is necessary being and for him to cease to be God would be sinful.

Turretin also argues that there are supernatural impossibilities: “what cannot be made even by the divine power.”<sup>6</sup> As Thomas Aquinas argued, God is free only to do that which can possibly be done. As Rogers says: “... in the classical tradition God’s omnipotence does not mean the ability to do anything logically impossible.”<sup>7</sup> Thus, for example, God is not free to make a square circle.

Since God does not, could not and would not want to do any of the things he cannot do, His freedom remains. He is unconstrained by anything outside of himself. The laws of rationality and goodness arise from God’s own being and so are not imposed on his against his will.

---

<sup>2</sup> Barth, CD, II/2, p162.

<sup>3</sup> Johnson, p59.

<sup>4</sup> Muller, Dictionary, p176

<sup>5</sup> Turretin, III.21.7.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Rogers, p32.

**(e) God is not free from necessity of consequences**

It is also uncontroversial amongst the Reformed Scholastics to allow that some of God's decrees and actions have "*necessitas consequentiae*: necessity of the consequences; i.e., a necessity brought about or conditioned by a previous contingent act or event so that the necessity itself arises out of contingent circumstances; thus conditional necessity.... The *neecessitas consequentiae* occurs continually in the finite order... and is applicable to God in terms of his *potentia ordinata*, or ordained power....granting the divine decree, God is bound to his own plan and promises. Therefore, the fulfilment of the divine plan and the divine promises is necessary... by a *necessitas consequentiae*."<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that God's freedom is maintained here since he establishes consequences. Cause and effect are God's laws or habits.

**(f) All God's acts are necessary: God must always act in conformity to his perfect wisdom**

In *On the Freedom of the Will* part 4 section 7, Jonathan Edwards writes "Concerning the necessity of the divine will" and goes beyond what we have already seen by defending the idea that: "the will of God himself, is necessary in all its determinations".

Edwards argued that it is a glorious truth that God's will is always determined by his perfect knowledge, wisdom and goodness. It is worth quoting at some length:

Infinite knowledge must direct the will without error. Here then, is the origin of moral necessity; and that is, really, of freedom. Perhaps it may be said, when the divine will is determined, from the consideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impelled, if that were possible. But it is unskillfulness, to suppose this an objection. The great principle is once established, *viz.* That the divine will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: it is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose will and power are constantly, immutably determined, by the consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with power, but without discerning and reason. It is beauty of this necessity, that it is strong as fate itself, with all the advantage of reason and goodness.

**(2) Objections to the necessity of God's actions**

**(a) God has liberty of indifference with respect to the creation**

Muller presents the Reformed Scholastic consensus that: "It is simply not the case that God wills all things by an absolute necessity of his nature: God necessarily but also spontaneously, without coercion or coaction, wills himself and his ultimate glory" but as Turretin says: "other things he wills freely because... no created thing is necessary with

---

<sup>8</sup> Muller, Dictionary, p200.

respect to God but contingent.”<sup>9</sup> Thus Turretin, Maccovis and Marckius argued that, as Muller says: “God is free to “abstain” entirely from the production of the world, not merely according to a “freedom of spontaneity” but also according to the “freedom of indifference” or “freedom of contrariety”.... none of the external objects of the divine willing are necessary to God and could all be “nilled” or “not-willed.”<sup>10</sup>

#### **(b) Necessity with respect to creation challenges God’s aseity**

The Reformed Scholastics have often rejected the notion that all God’s actions are necessary since this would seem to challenge His aseity (God’s complete independence and satisfaction in himself). For example, if God had to create this world, they sense that He has become in some way dependant on it or was motivated by some weakness, need or lack.

#### **(c) A necessary creation would seem coeternal with God**

Muller describes how Marckius makes the point explicitly “against the notion of a necessary creation that is in some sense coeternal with God .”<sup>11</sup> If God had to make this world, one might ask why he didn’t have to make it sooner. Though the question of time does not make sense before the creation of time, didn’t God “always” have to make or have made this universe?

#### **(d) A God who does good from necessity would not deserve our thanks**

Rowe and Rogers both describe the fairly common argument that a God who does good from necessity and not from choice, a God who cannot avoid doing good, would not deserve our gratitude<sup>12</sup>.

#### **(e) “Perfect world” arguments fail as we could always think of a better world**

Rowe describes how Aquinas rejected the idea that God must create this world since he thinks we can always think of a better world. Rowe says that: “The prevailing and initially plausible view is that it would not be inconsistent with God’s perfect goodness for him to create a very good world, though he could have created a better world.”<sup>13</sup> The choice is between creating a very good world and no world since there is no such thing as a maximally perfect world. God therefore takes the better option and decides to make a very good world.

#### **(f) Creation is not necessary to the display of God’s glory**

---

<sup>9</sup> Muller, PRRD, p448 and Turretin, Institutes, III.xiv.5. Muller also cites Zanchi, Beza et. al. and Wollebius in support of this view.

<sup>10</sup> Muller, PRRD, p448.

<sup>11</sup> Marckius, Compendium, VIII.12, cited in Muller, PRRD, p448.

<sup>12</sup> Rowe, p2 and Rogers, p103.

<sup>13</sup> Rowe, p4.

It would seem that creation is unnecessary for the display of God's glory since it would be possible for the members of the Trinity merely to imagine a world in which their perfections were infinitely displayed and to contemplate that.

**(g) If humans are to be free, God must limit his freedom**

It has been common to argue that if human beings are to experience genuine freedom then God must have (freely chosen to) draw a line around his own freedom and limited those actions over which he directly exercises his sovereignty.

**(h) God is passible hence not free**

Barth argues that God's free choice to relate to human beings means that he risks himself: "When one considers that God wants to coexist with sinners, then his freedom includes his willingness "for the sake of man" to "hazard Himself wholly and utterly"<sup>14</sup>.

In treating Polanus' discussion of impassibility Barth says that "in substance as well as in terminology we are transported to quite a different world" to that of the Bible. For Barth, Polanus' exposition of classical theism is in "irreparable conflict with God's freedom, love and life"<sup>15</sup>.

**(3) Responses to objections**

**(a) A developing tradition on necessity in God**

Though it remains something of a minority report, it is perhaps not too fanciful to suggest that there is almost a developing tradition towards necessity in Christian theology. In addition to Edwards on creation, one might consider discussion of the necessity of the incarnation in Irenaeus<sup>16</sup> and of God punishing sin in Owen<sup>17</sup>.

**(b) Necessary freedom is happy**

Edwards insists that nothing good is being sacrificed by speaking of all of God's actions as necessary. God's sovereignty is not threatened by his unconstrained will always to do the best:

That all the seeming force of such objections and exclamations must arise from an imagination that there is some sort of privilege or dignity in being without such a moral necessity as will make it impossible to do any other than always choose what is wisest and best. [It is] as though there were some disadvantage, meanness, and subjection, in such a necessity. A thing by which the will was confined, kept under, and held in servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that held him fast, and that he could, by no

---

<sup>14</sup> Barth, CD, II/2, p164.

<sup>15</sup> Barth, CD, II/1, p492.

<sup>16</sup> Irenaeus, Adv. Her., I, chapter 2, section 4, pp332ff.

<sup>17</sup> Owen, Dissertation on Divine Justice (1652) in Works.

means, deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dishonor to a being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner, from the necessary perfection of his own nature. This argues no imperfection, inferiority, or dependence, nor any want of dignity, privilege, or ascendancy.

Far from sacrificing God's freedom, God's necessity of will is grounded on freedom: he unfailingly wants to do what is best and cannot be diverted from his most excellent actions:

It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the whole. But... this is consistent with the greatest freedom, and most perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable rectitude of will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise being to act foolishly.

So, Edwards concludes:

There is no other divine sovereignty but this; and this is properly absolute sovereignty. No other is desirable; nor would any other be honorable or happy and, indeed, there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that God's will is determined by his own infinite, all-sufficient wisdom in everything. And in nothing at all, is [it] either directed by any inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom; whereby it would become senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design, or end.

**(c) If God's existence and perfections are necessary, why not his will?**

Edwards argues that God's will is necessary without making him dependant, just as it is commonly agreed that God's existence and other attributes are necessary:

It no more argues any dependence of God's will, that his supremely wise volition is necessary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be something too low for the Supreme Being to have his will determined by moral necessity, so as necessarily, in every case, to will in the highest degree holy and happily; then why is it not also something too low for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infinite happiness, determined by necessity? It is no more to God's dishonor to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy

As Edwards notes, his interlocutor, the author of the *Essay on the Freedom of Will*, "represents that doctrine of the divine will's being in everything necessarily determined by a superior fitness, as making the blessed God a kind of almighty minister and mechanical medium of fate." In response to this it is worth stating again that God is not subservient to some external principle (such as natural law or fate) to which he must conform. God's actions are an outworking of his own will, and he delights that it is so.

**(d) God's necessity is praiseworthy**

God's goodness and power deserve our thanks and praise even though they are necessary to his being and he could not do otherwise. Indeed, we have seen Edwards praising God for these attributes. This praise is fitting since these are God's own moral perfections which he causes and for which he is responsible<sup>18</sup>. He is to be praised since he chooses to be this way and delights to exercise these perfections.

**(e) The universe has a necessity that depends on the independent God**

As was hinted above, a number of writers express concern that if God must create this world then the universe has become necessary. This is true, but it should be noted that the universe has a different kind of necessity from God himself. We have argued against many of the Reformed Scholastics that the universe has a kind of "*necessitas consequentis*: necessity of the consequent; i.e., the necessity of something that cannot be other than what it is.... A necessity of the consequent arises out of a connection of necessary causes with the effects that must follow from them."<sup>19</sup> But we would distinguish the self-necessity of God from the consequent necessity of the universe. This universe is necessary consequent upon the God of the Bible existing, whereas God is necessary in or from Himself. The universe exists from God as a consequence of His will whereas God exists from Himself. Clearly such a consequentially necessary universe in no way rivals God or diminishes his glory.

Edwards clarifies that the creation has no claim in itself over God and does not of itself call forth its existence from God:

There was, indeed, no necessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at all; because he is, in himself, infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was, also, no necessity in nature, that he should preserve and continue things in being, after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient without their continuance, as he was before their creation. But it was fit and wise and good, that infinite wisdom should manifest, and infinite goodness communicate itself: and therefore it was necessary, in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made *at such a time*, and continued *so long*, and indeed with various perfections in such degrees, as infinite wisdom and goodness saw it wisest and best that they should.

**(f) The dependant necessity of the universe does not require it to be eternal**

As the above quotation shows, a dependently necessary creation need not be eternal. Language of space and time begins to break down pretty quickly at this point, but it is perfectly congruent with the argument that God had to create to say that God has an uncreated eternal existence in contrast to the created temporal order. We cannot say that on the necessity view, God ought to have created the universe "sooner", since time itself

---

<sup>18</sup> Similarly, Rowe, p7.

<sup>19</sup> Muller, Dictionary, p200.

is a function of the created spatial order and therefore there was no “sooner before time began”, so to speak.

**(g) The “no perfect world” argument rules out the possibility of a Perfect Being**

The argument that there can never be a perfect world proves too much for a Christian theologian. As Rowe argues that: “... no such being as God could even exist if for every creatable world there is a better creatable world. This argument depends on the following principle: If an omniscient being creates a world when it could have created a better world then it is possible that there be a being morally better than it. From this principle and the assumption that for any creatable world there is a better creatable world, it follows that an all-powerful, omniscient creator of a world is a being than which a better being is possible. But the theistic God is by nature an unsurpassable being, a being than which a better being is not possible. Therefore, so the argument goes, if there is no best world, the exalted God of Judaism, Christianity and Islam does not exist.”<sup>20</sup>

**(h) An existing perfect world is better than an imagined perfect world**

If it is granted that it is better to exist than not to exist then it is better that God should create the best possible world that displays his glory, rather than merely that the persons of the Trinity should imagine it. A created world further allows that creatures should actually experience in practice and action the display of God’s glory.

**(i) Liberty of indifference is a problematic concept**

To say that God has liberty of indifference with respect to some decisions is to suggest that there are some decisions of God’s which are unconditioned: more than one equally wise and good courses of action present themselves and God has the power to choose one *or other* of the alternatives. If God’s will is genuinely indifferent and unconditioned, then how does he choose? Why is he not paralysed by indecision? Liberty of indifference in God seems to make some actions in God arbitrary or random, which is hardly a desirable manner of freedom even, or especially, for God.

Barth argues that “to be mired in deliberating among contrary choices is not to be free at all but bondage.”<sup>21</sup> Rather, God is free from all conflictedness and confusion: “God does not deliberate and then choose to be gracious, but God “determines” [the verb, *bestimmen*] to be the gracious one God already is.”<sup>22</sup>

Barth rejects a version of late medieval Nominalism’s concept of God as the essence of absolute freedom, *potentia absoluta*, absolute power, “the almighty divine arbitrariness and independence, bound by no law.... What he [Barth] was criticizing was a view of God that equipped him with this kind of absolute power, a God who was thought of as “an unconditioned God, a God who is free *in abstracto*, whose being is an “abstract absoluteness or naked sovereignty” in the sense that His caprice as such constitutes His

---

<sup>20</sup> Rowe, p4f.

<sup>21</sup> Johnson, p59.

<sup>22</sup> Johnson, p60.



divine being and therefore the principle of His world-government!”<sup>23</sup>. Rather, for Barth, God is free to love.

Busch writes that for Barth: “God’s freedom is, to begin with, his exclusion of all arbitrariness from his freedom”<sup>24</sup>.

As Edwards puts it, God’s is unfailingly governed by his wisdom:

It is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend it choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side.

Edwards suggests that liberty of indifference (liberty not determined by wisdom) is like the so-called freedom of madmen and fools, and not at all proper to God:

Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man’s self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools are the only free men. Yet, I think, nobody would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already.

The original sin may be the closest thing to the exercise of liberty of indifference. Adam’s first sin would seem an instance of irrationality, inexplicable, not determined by his good nature, a privation of sense<sup>25</sup>.

#### **(j) Human freedom is not threatened by divine freedom**

On the compatibilist account of freedom pursued here and as a defining mark in the Reformed tradition, genuine human freedom is not threatened by absolute divine sovereignty since human beings have the liberty of spontaneity described above and power of contrary choice is no necessary part of true freedom.

#### **(k) A more simple freedom?**

---

<sup>23</sup> Busch, p112f citing Barth, CD, II/2 p49.

<sup>24</sup> Busch, p115, c.f. Barth, CD, I/1, p318.

<sup>25</sup> The same considerations could be applied to the fall of Satan, though the Bible might suggest that Adam’s original sin is a more proper subject for theological reflection.

Some accounts of the freedom of God might sound as if they have made it a composite attribute with some actions being free in some ways and some in others.

It is worth hearing Edward's warning about the difficulty of our speaking about God (and his will being determined by his wisdom):

when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent, independent, of perfect and absolute simplicity and immutability, and the first cause of all things; doubtless there must be less propriety in such representations, than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and liable to perpetual mutation and succession.

However, it is only fair to say that not all distinctions threaten simplicity: we would be prepared to say that the simple God who is love, loves the Son, believers and the unregenerate in different ways. So, as Bavinck says: "Although God wills himself and his creatures with one and the same simple act, still, with a view to the different objects of that will, we must make certain distinctions."<sup>26</sup>

Perhaps simplicity makes its real contribution to the doctrine of God's freedom in the fact that it does not allow us to prioritise the attributes of God or oppose them to one another as if they were separate and potentially opposing parts of a complex deity. The desire to grant God liberty of indifference comes from considering his power (ability to do things) without his wisdom and goodness (his determination always to do what is best). Simplicity reminds us that God is perfectly free in his power and perfectly powerful in his freedom.

Further, we should recall that God is simple, eternal, being fully in act. All of God's attributes are his essence. It is not so much that God possesses the quality of love but that he loves. God is his single, simple, eternal act. Thus, God is the "creating-this-world" God and were he to create a different world he would no longer be the same God.

### **(I) Rahner's dictum safeguarded**

The view that all God's actions are necessary out workings of his nature provides a strong support of Rahner's dictum that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity. God's ontology determines his actions. There are no unactualised potential acts in the eternal God. Not only is he being fully in act *ad intra*, his free will is also entirely fulfilled. He not only does what he wants but he does all that he could want actually to do.

### **Conclusion**

It is biblical and consistent to think that God is freely necessary and necessarily free. Reformed theologians should recognise that, if it is done carefully, nothing is lost by

---

<sup>26</sup> Bavinck, p233.

denying liberty of indifference or power of contrary choice to God. The necessity of all God's actions is a cause of wonder and praise, comfort and confidence to the believer.

### Bibliography

Ames, William, *The Marrow of Theology* edited by John D. Eusden (Baker Books, Grand Rapids, 1968) translated from the third Latin edition, 1629.

Asselt, Willem J. van and Dekker, Eef, *Reformation and Scholasticism: An Eccumenical Enterprise* (Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2001)

Barth, Karl, *Church Dogmatics* Bromiley, G. W. & Torrance, T. F. (eds) (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1957)

Barth, Karl, *The Epistle To The Romans* translated from the sixth edition by Hoskyns, Edwyn C. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1933)

Barth, Karl, *Evangelical Theology: An Introduction* translated by Foley, Grover (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963)

Bavinck, Herman, *Reformed Dogmatics* ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2003)

Beilby, James, 'Divine Aseity, Divine Freedom: A Conceptual Problem for Edwardsian-Calvinism' in the *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* (December 2004), pp647-58

Berkouwer, G. C., *Sin* (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1971)

Blocher, Henri, *Original Sin* (Leicester, Apollos, 1997)

Bray, Gerald, *Doctrine of God* (Leicester, IVP, 1993)

Bromiley, Geoffrey W., *Introduction to the Theology of Karl Barth* (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1979)

Bromiley, Geoffrey, 'Only God is Free' *Christianity Today*, Feb 2004, pp72-75

Busch, Eberhard, *The Great Passion: An introduction to Karl Barth's Theology* translated by Bromiley, Geoffrey W., edited and annotated by Guder, Darrell and Judith (Cambridge, Eerdmans, 2004)

Clark, Kelly James, Lints, Richard, Rmith, James K. A., *101 Key Terms in Philosophy and Their Importance for Theology* (London, Westminster John Knox Press, 2004)

Dekker, Eef, 'An Eccumenical Debate between Reformation and Counter-Reformation? Bellarmine and Ames on *liberum arbitrium*' pp141-154 in Asselt, Willem J. van and Dekker, Eef, *Reformation and Scholasticism: An Eccumenical Enterprise* (Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2001)

Edwards, Jonathan, *Freedom of the Will* ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 1957 / 1985) viewed online at and quoted from:  
<http://www.jonathanedwards.com/text/FoW/Part%20IV%20The%20Reasoning%20of%20The%20Arminian%20View%20of%20Liberty/4.7.htm>

*Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1985), 'Leibnitz'

Ford, David, (ed) *Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century* second edition (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1997)

Frame, John, *Doctrine of God* (Philpsburg, P&R Publishing, 2002)

Green, Clifford (ed), *Karl Barth: theologian of freedom* (London, Collins, 1989)

Harris, James A., *Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) [added 9/6/05]

Hart, Trevor, *Regarding Karl Barth: Essays towards a reading of his theology* (Carlisle, Paternoster, 1999)

Heppe, Heinrich, *Reformed Dogmatics set out and illustrated from the sources* with foreword by Barth, Karl, revised and edited by Bizer, Ernst, English translation by Thompson (Grand Rapids, Baker Book House)

Iveson, Ron, *The Practical Implications of Freewill Theism* unpublished BA dissertation (London, Oak Hill College, 2000)

Jenson, Robert W., *Systematic Theology* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, volume 2, 1999)

Johnson, William Stacy, *The Mystery of God: Karl Barth and the Postmodern Foundations of Theology* Columbia Series in Reformed Theology (Louisville, Westminster John Knox, 1997)

Kane, Robert (ed), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002)

Kelly, J. N. D., *Early Christian Doctrines* fifth edition 1977 (London, A & C Black, 1958)

McDowell, John C., and Higton, Mike, (ed.s) *Conversing with Barth* (Aldershot, Ashgrove Publishing, 2004)

Molnar, Paul D., *Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity in dialogue with Karl Barth and contemporary theology* (London, T & T Clark, 2002)

Muller, Richard A., *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms Drawn Principally From Protestant Scholastic Theology* (Paternoster, Carlisle, 1985)

Muller, Richard, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725* (Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2003)

O'Donovan, Oliver, *On The Thirty Nine Articles: A Conversation with Tudor Christianity* (Exeter, Paternoster, 1986)

Peterson, David (ed), *Holiness & Sexuality: Homosexuality in a biblical context* Papers from the Seventh Oak Hill College Annual School of Theology (Milton Keynes, Paternoster, 2004)

Plantinga, Cornelius, *Not The Way Its Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin* (Leicester, Apollos, 1995)

Prestige, G. L., *God in Patristic Thought* first published 1936 (London, SPCK, 1959)

Ramm, Bernard, *Offense to Reason: A Theology of Sin* (Vancouver, Regent College Publishing, 1985)

*The Reformation and Puritan Bookshelf* CD ROM collections and indexes

*The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* on historical principles by Little, Folwer and Coulsob, revised and edited, Onions, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition revised by Friedrichsen (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973)

Turretin, Francis, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology* Giger (trans), Dennison (ed) (Philipsburg, P&R Publishing, 1997)

Ward, Graham (ed) *The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1997)

Webster, John, *Barth*, Outstanding Christian Thinkers series second edition 2004 (London, Continuum, 2000)

Webster, John, (ed) *The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000)

Pictet, Benedict, *Christian Theology: translated from the Latin...* by Frederick Reyroux 1833 (London, Seely and Burnside etc. publishers, 1834)

Rogers, Katherin A., *Perfect Being Theology* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2000)

Rowe, William L., *Can God Be Free?* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004)

Torrance, Thomas F., *Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian* (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1990)

Trueman, Carl R., and Clark, R. S., *Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment* (Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 1999)

Witsius, Herman, *The Economy of the Covenants Between God and Man: Comprehending a Complete Body of Divinity...* translated from the Latin... by William Crookshank etc. (London, Baynes etc. 1822) (Edmoonton, Still Water Revival Books)